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MARITIME AVIATION DEATHS
CALVIN F. DAVID*
I. INTRODUCTION
he liquidity of the earth's surface guarantees the applica-
bility of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)1 to
numerous aviation disasters. The Supreme Court recently
held, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,2 that the measure
of damages in an action for wrongful death on the high seas is
limited to the pecuniary measure prescribed by DOHSA.
Thus, where DOHSA applies, the remedy is exclusive. The
Higginbotham decision apparently establishes DOHSA as the
exclusive remedy for death on the high seas.
This paper will examine DOHSA and related federal reme-
dies including the Jones Act8 and the judicially-created gen-
eral maritime "wrongful death remedy".4 It will address the
issues of jurisdiction, exclusivity, interaction of foreign law
and the measure of damages.
II. HISTORY
Any study of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)
must begin with the 1886 case of The Harrisburg, in which
the Supreme Court held that, like the common law, the gen-
* J.D., 1968, B.B.A., 1965-University of Miami; Mr. David is a partner with Thorn-
ton, David & Murray, P.A., in Miami, Florida. The assistance of Carolyn Pickard in
the preparation of the paper is gratefully acknowledged.
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
2 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
3 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
4 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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eral maritime law provides no remedy for wrongful death.
Absent a state or federal statute, admiralty provides no such
remedy.' The Supreme Court's decision in The Harrisburg
was not popular and the Court attempted to ameliorate its
harshness by ruling, in The Hamilton, that a state's wrongful
death act could apply to a maritime fatality. But there was
still no federal maritime remedy until 1920, when Congress
finally repudiated the holding in The Harrisburg and enacted
DOHSA,8 creating a remedy in admiralty for any' death,
"caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the
high seas beyond a marine league [three nautical miles] from
the shore of any State. . . ."' DOHSA limits damages to the
pecuniary loss of the survivor,' 0 establishes a three-year stat-
ute of limitations," provides a right of action in admiralty
under foreign law where foreign law grants such a right,2 and
permits suits filed by a victim to continue as wrongful death
actions if the victim dies of his injuries while suit is pending."
In 1920, Congress also passed the Jones Act" which pro-
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
* See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 379-93. The common law rule that allowed recovery for
injury but not for death was a legal anomaly stemming from the felony-merger doc-
trine, a feature of early English law. Id.
T 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
* Enacted by the Act of Mar. 30, 1920, Pub. L. No 66-165, 41 Stat. 537 (codified at
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976)).
* 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976). DOHSA also applies to deaths occurring beyond a marine
league from any territory or dependency of the United States. DOHSA claims may be
made for negligence or unseaworthiness. Recent decisions have recognized strict lia-
bility claims. See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631
(8th Cir. 1972); Miller Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 473 F.Supp. 1147 (S.D.
Ala. 1979). Three nautical miles is equivalent to 3.45 statute miles.
:0 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976).
1 46 U.S.C. § 763 (1976), repealed by Act of Oct. 6, 1980, Pub. L. 96-382, § 2, 94
Stat. 1525 (1980). The original limitations period was two years. In 1980, Congress
established a uniform three-year statute of limitations for personal injury or death
arising out of a maritime tort. 46 U.S.C. § 763(a) (Supp. IV 1981).
Is 46 U.S.C. § 764 (1976).
Is 46 U.S.C. § 765 (1976). DOHSA also preserves the applicability of local law of
the Great Lakes, in the Panama Canal Zone, and within a state's territorial waters. 46
U.S.C. § 767 (1976). Contributory negligence will not bar recovery. 46 U.S.C. § 766
(1976).
14 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The Jones Act states:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
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vides seamen a right of action in negligence for personal in-
jury against an employer and, in the case of death, provides
the seaman's survivors a right of action in negligence for
wrongful death.15 Unlike DOHSA," the Jones Act applies only
to seamen within or without a state's territorial waters." A
Jones Act action is limited to negligence' s while DOHSA af-
fords a cause of action for both negligence and unseaworthi-
ness.19 A seaman may not recover under a state's wrongful-
death act as the Jones Act preempts the field.20
After 1920, recovery was available for the death of a seaman
regardless of the locale of the tort as long as the locality was
maritime and within the purview of the Jones Act.'1 Recovery
was available under DOHSA for the death of a non-seaman
beyond a state's territorial waters. But the "dead hand of The
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common-law right or rem-
edy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in
case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury
the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for
damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of ac-
tion for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
Jurisdicton in such actions shall be under the court of the district in
which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located.
Id.
15 Id. See Guidry v. South La. Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1980)
in which the court noted that: "The traditional formulation of the requirements for
identifying a seaman are: (1) he must have more or less permanent connection with
(2) a vessel in navigation and, (3) must contribute to the function of the vessel, the
accomplishment of its mission or its operation or welfare in terms of its
maintenance."
,e 46 U.S.C. § 376 (1976).
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). See supra note 14.
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976). The Jones Act does not specify which'damages are recov-
erable, but it incorporates the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §
51-60 (1976) which specifically limits recovery to pecuniary loss.
The Supreme Court has observed that: "The two statutes were enacted within days
to address related problems-yet they are 'hopelessly inconsistent with each other.'"
American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 283 (1980); see Bodden v. Ameri-
can Offshore Inc., 681 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1982).
20 See Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); see also In re Dearborn
Marine Serv. Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, Monk v. Chambers &
Kennedy, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
21 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
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Harrisburg"'" denied a federal maritime remedy for the death
of a non-seaman within a marine league from a state's shores.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court overruled its de-
cision in The Harrisburg2' in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc.'4 The Court in Moragne recognized a general mari-
time remedy for wrongful death.2" Specifically, Moragne per-
mitted recovery under any unseaworthiness doctrine for death
in territorial waters." The gap left open by DOHSA and the
Jones Act was partially closed.27 The Moragne court declined
iS Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 1975).
IS d.
24 398 U.S. 375 (1970). The Court observed that, "[Tihe [Harrisburg] decision,
somewhat dubious even when rendered, is such an unjustifiable anomaly in the pre-
sent maritime law that it should no longer be followed." Id. at 378.
. Id. at 401.
"Id.
2 The Supreme Court in Moragne, discussing the anamolies of the law at that
time, stated:
The United States, participating as amicus curiae, contended at oral
argument that these statutes, if construed to forbid recognition of a
general maritime remedy for wrongful death within territorial waters,
would perpetuate three anomalies of present law. The first of these is
simply the discrepancy produced whenever the rule of The Harrisburg
holds sway: within territorial waters, identical conduct violating fed-
eral law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liabil-
ity if the victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed. As
we have concluded, such a distinction is not compatible with the gen-
eral policies of federal maritime law.
The second incongruity is that identical breaches of the duty to pro-
vide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the
three-mile limit-since a claim under the Death on the High Seas Act
may be founded on unseaworthiness, see Kernan v. American Dredg-
ing Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958)-but not within the territorial
waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims.
The United States argues that since the substantive duty is federal,
and federal maritime jurisdiction covers navigable waters within and
without the three-mile limit, no rational policy supports this distinc-
tion in the availability of a remedy.
The third, and assertedly the "strangest" anomaly is that a true sea-
man-that is, a member of a ship's company, covered by the Jones
Act-is provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness
within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to whom the duty of
seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work tradition-
ally done by seamen, does have such a remedy when allowed by a state
statute.
Id. at 395-96.
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to decide questions of beneficiaries and damages.28 The Court
left those issues to lower courts with instruction to analogize
to DOHSA, the Jones Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act and state wrongful-death acts."'
Four years later, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
damages in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet.0 Although the
Court had instructed in Moragne that, for the sake of uni-
formity, the new remedy should be modeled after the federal
maritime statutes,"1 the Gaudet Court chose to align the gen-
eral maritime scope of damages with the non-pecuniary stan-
dards of the majority of state wrongful death acts." The
Court approved recovery for loss of society and funeral ex-
penses.83 Gaudet appeared incompatible with Moragne's ex-
pressed goal of uniformity among the federal statutes. As one
commentator observed: "[T]he Court chose humanity and
thereby sacrificed uniformity.""
Compared with the situation a few years ago when there
was no remedy for wrongful death, the seascape following
Gaudet was afloat with remedies providing disparate recov-
eries.8 5 After Moragne and Gaudet, DOHSA provided for a
pecuniary loss-only recovery for death resulting from negli-
gence or unseaworthiness occurring beyond a marine league;"
the Jones Act provided pecuniary loss-only recovery for the
negligent deaths of seamen within or beyond the marine
" Id. at 407-08.
" Id.
o 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408.
u Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 584-92.
Swaim, Requiem for Moragne: The New Uniformity, 25 Loyola L. Rev. 1, 17
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Swaim]. Indeed, various lower courts, during the post-
Moragne but pre-Gaudet period, were constrained to follow the Moragne decision's
(apparent) direction and deny recovery for non-pecuniary damages for wrongful
death under the general maritime law. See, e.g., Petition of Canal Barge Co., 323 F.
Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
88 See, e.g., remedies found in DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976); the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1976); and state wrongful death acts.
" 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
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league boundary;87 state wrongful-death acts, most of which
permit non-pecuniary recovery, operated within a marine
league from its shore; the general maritime law, permitting
non-pecuniary recovery also operated within a marine league
for unseaworthiness claims.38 The question remained: How far
out does the general maritime law extend? Does it intrude on
DOHSA's statutory province?39
These questions were, arguably, answered in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham."° This action arose from the crash of a
helicopter used by Mobil in connection with its oil-drilling op-
erations in the Gulf of Mexico about 100 miles from the Loui-
siana shore. The passengers' widows brought suit in admiralty
under DOHSA and the Jones Act.41 The district court found
negligence and awarded pecuniary damages only.42 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to
claim damages for loss of society.' s
s? 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
" Both the Moragne and Gaudet decisions involved deaths occurring within a
state's territorial boundaries.
" The lower courts were split as to the effect of Gaudet on DOHSA actions. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals gave the decision a strict construction and held that
DOHSA's pecuniary-only standard prevailed over the more liberal judicial creation.
Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 797 (1st Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit, on the
other hand, read the case more expansively and stated that the statutory remedy
provided by DOHSA was no longer needed. See Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d
242 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 436 U.S. 618 (1978). Higginbotham was the last case in what one author has
dubbed "the unholy trilogy". Swaim, supra note 34, at 64. Professor Swaim and
others have criticized the "trilogy" decisions as inconsistent and contrary to the cur-
rent tide of liberal recovery evidenced by the non-pecuniary recovery permitted by
most state wrongful-death acts. Perhaps a more compelling argument is that Con-
grass has expressed no indication of such a wave and the Higginbotham Court quite
appropriately declined to travel in legislative waters. The Court recently observed
that: "[TIhe liability schemes incorporated in DOHSA and the Jones Act should not
be accorded overwhelming analogical weight in formulating remedies under general
maritime law." American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 281 (1980) (ac-
knowledging the current prevailing views on loss of society compensation).
,' 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
" 360 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. La. 1973).
42 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977). The panel was compelled to follow Law v. Sea
Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1975). Interestingly, the Higginbotham judges
stated that if the matter were one of first impression they would have reached a re-
suilt similar to that of the First Circuit in Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir.
1974) and "read Moragne to say that DOHSA is the exclusive wrongful death remedy
outside of state territorial waters." 545 F.2d at 436 n.19. See supra note 40 and ac-
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the single
issue of whether, under DOHSA, plaintiffs were entitled to re-
covery for non-pecuniary damages such as loss of society. 4 In
other words, whether, in addition to the damages authorized
by the Act, a decedent's survivors may also recover damages
under general maritime law. Justice Stevens articulated the
Court's task to be one of deciding: "[W]hich measure of dam-
ages to apply in a death action arising on the high seas-the
rule chosen by Congress in 1920 or the rule chosen by this
Court in Gaudet.""
The Supreme Court followed the rule chosen by Congress,
that is, DOHSA's statutory limit of recovery, and reversed the
Fifth Circuit's award of damages for loss of society." The
Court acknowledged that admiralty courts often have to sup-
plement maritime statutes, but observed that:
The Death on the High Seas Act, however, announces Con-
gress' considered judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries,
the limitations period, contributory negligence, survival, and
damages .... The Act does not address every issue of wrong-
ful-death law ... but when it does speak directly to a ques-
tion, the courts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer
so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless.' 7
Higginbotham resolved the issue of the measure of dam-
ages, but many other issues were left to be settled. The re-
mainder of this paper will focus on these specific issues.
IV. JURISDICTION
The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
companying text.
" 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
" 436 U.S. at 623. At least one circuit court has interpreted Higgingbotham nar-
rowly. In Ford v. Wooten, No. 80-5959, slip op. (11th Cir. July 26, 1982), the court
refused to extend Moragne to permit recovery under the general maritime law for
wrongful death caused by negligence. The Ford decision limited Higginbotham to un-
seaworthiness claims and followed instead, Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d
524, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980), in which the
Court declined to supplement a Jones Act negligence claim with the Moragne-Gaudet
unseaworthiness measure of damages.
16 436 U.S. at 626.
7 Id. at 625.
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United States shall extend to all cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction. 8 Congress implemented this power in Sec-
tion 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."'
Admiralty was an important part of our early colonial juris-
prudence. We were a seafaring nation and the early admiralty
courts decided many maritime disputes including actions in
contract, torts, and piracy. Shipping on the high seas was of
paramount importance to the young country. Although the
early decisions dealt with sailing ships rather than aircraft,
many of the maritime principles established then are applied
to aviation tort cases today. 0
A. Maritime Locality - Maritime Activity
Whether a tort was cognizable in admiralty historically de-
pended on the maritime location of the wrong - the "strict
locality" or "locality alone" test. As the Supreme Court made
clear in The Plymouth," the standard for whether the tort
was maritime was whether the tort occurred on the high seas
or navigable waters, not whether the wrong occurred onboard
a vessel.5 2
U.S. CONST. ART. III § 2, cl. 1.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). See Hebert v. Diamond M. Co.,
367 So.2d 1210 (La. App. 1978). The "Savings to Suitors" clause preserved the right
of plaintiffs to pursue common law remedies in state courts. If an action cognizable in
admiralty is brought in state court under this clause, the state court must apply sub-
stantive federal maritime law. Id.
50 See Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
wherein, DOHSA was held applicable to wrongful deaths arising from crashes of land-
based aircraft which occurred on the high seas beyond a marine league from shore.
Admiralty jurisdiction over aviation cases has been extended beyond DOHSA to gen-
eral maritime actions, see, e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409
U.S. 249 (1972).
o' 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
S The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, currently codified at 46 U.S.C. §
740 (1976), was first enacted in 1948 to overrule cases such as The Plymouth. It pro-
vides in relevant part: "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property,
MARITIME AVIATION DEATHS
The Plymouth,"3 however, did not expressly hold that local-
ity alone is the exclusive test for admiralty jurisdiction. Some
later courts, attempting to decide upon a test for admiralty
jurisdiction, have articulated a nexus requirement in addition
to the maritime locality. This "locality plus" standard was
adopted by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland. " The Court addressed the complex
jurisdictional issues involving airplane accidents and con-
cluded that, in addition to the maritime locality, the wrong
must bear a "significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity." ' 55 The Court noted: "[U]nless such a relationship ex-
ists, claims arising from airplane accidents are not cognizable
in admiralty in the absence of legislation to the contrary."56
The impact of Executive Jet has been prodigious. Since the
court did not define what constitutes a "significant relation-
ship,' 57 lower courts have grappled with that concept and
with the application of the two-pronged test of maritime lo-
cality and maritime nexus. In Holland v. Sea-Lane Service,"
a longshoreman's activity of transporting containers from
storage on land to a pier for loading was considered maritime
activity,59 but because the injury occurred on land, it did not
meet the locality plus test.e0 On the other hand, injuries in-
curred by shipyard workers from exposure to asbestos insula-
tion materials used in the construction and repair of ships
have been held cognizable in admiralty."
caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be
done or consummated on land." Id.
70 U.S. 20 (3 Wall) (1865).
409 U.S. 249 (1972). Executive Jet did not abolish the locality test. Instead, the
Court therein added a second prerequisite for admiralty jurisdiction, stating: "It is far
more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to require also that the
wrong bear a significant relationship to the traditional maritime activity." 409 U.S. at
268. See Holland v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 655 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1274 (1981).
" 409 U.S. at 268.
"Id.
'7 Id.
655 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1274 (1982).
59 Id. at 558.
" Id.
01 See White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1037 (1982).
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A fixed platform, located in the Gulf of Mexico and used for
offshore oil and gas exploration, has been held not to consti-
tute a maritime locality, although a floating platform used for
the same purposes does. 2 A helicopter flight over the Gulf of
Mexico from one land base (Key West, Florida) to another
(St. Petersburg, Florida) has been held not to bear a signifi-
cant relationship to traditional maritime activity. 5e A flight
from Atlantic City, New Jersey to Block Island, New York has
been held not to be "maritime activity"64 while a flight be-
tween St. Thomas, Virgin Islands to Fajardo, Puerto Rico has
been held to constitute "maritime activity."'
The cases involving aviation torts demonstrate the difficulty
in applying the Executive Jet doctrine to airplane accidents.
It has been questioned whether the post-Executive Jet deci-
sions are more uniform than those antedating the case."' It is
unclear whether Executive Jet solved what it termed "the
perverse and causistic borderline situations that have demon-
strated some of the problems with the locality test of mari-
time tort jurisdiction. "67
B. The Executive Jet Rule and DOHSA
The preceding has been an analysis of Executive Jet's im-
pact on general maritime cases." The accident in Executive
Jet involved the crash of an aircraft into Lake Erie, an inland
" See Myriek v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (turning on whether the structure could be classified as a "vessel").
" See Teachey v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
" See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 657
(M.D. Pa. 1975).
" See, e.g., Hubscham v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977).
The aircraft in question was a sea plane flying over international waters. The court
quoted the Executive Jet hypothetical which postulates a maritime nexus in the case
of a mid-ocean crash of a plane flying from New York to London since the flight's
function is one traditionally performed by waterborne vessels. Id. at 835-36. It is ar-
guable that a plane or helicopter flying across the Gulf of Mexico is also performing a
function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels.
" See, eg., Hubscham v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 836 (D.V.I.
1977).
61 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 255 (1972).
" See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
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sea, clearly not within the purview of DOHSA.6 9 The Execu-
tive Jet Court, in a comprehensive examination of admiralty
jurisdiction over aviation torts, expressly excluded DOHSA
actions from its "significant relationship to traditional mari-
time activity" standard.7 0 The Supreme Court stated:
[W]e conclude that the mere fact that the alleged wrong "oc-
curs" or "is located" on or over navigable waters-whatever that
means in an aviation context-is not of itself significant to turn
an airplane negligence case into a "maritime tort." It is far
more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to
require also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity. We hold that unless such a rela-
tionship exists, claims arising from airplane accidents are not
cognizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to the
contrary.7
1
The Court continued:
Of course, under the Death on the High Seas Act, a wrongful-
death action arising out of an airplane crash on the high seas
beyond a marine league from the shore of a State may clearly
be brought in a federal admiralty court.72
Some such flights, e.g., New York City to Miami, Florida, no
doubt involve passage over "the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any State." To the extent that the
terms of the Death on the High Seas Act become applicable to
such flights, that Act, of course, is 'legislation to the
contrary.'
7 3
Notwithstanding the Executive Jet's clear exclusion of
DOHSA from its nexus requirement,74 some courts and com-
mentators" have, nevertheless, examined DOHSA claims for a
maritime nexus. The district court in Higginbotham v. Mobil
o9 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
70 409 U.S. at 268.
71 Id. (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 271 n.20.
Id. at 274 n.26.
Id. at 268-71.
75 See, e.g., Calamari, The Wake of Executive Jet - A Major Wave or a Minor
Ripple, 4 Mar. Law. 52, 83 (1979).
1983]
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Oil Corp.,76 analyzed the activity engaged in by the helicopter
and concluded that it was "traditionally maritime."'77 In Hay-
den v. Krusling78 a Florida district court recently held, in a
DOHSA action, that the aircraft's flight from New Orleans,
Louisiana to Pensacola, Florida across the Gulf of Mexico
bore no significant relationship to traditional maritime activ-
ity.79 It dismissed the action on the authority of Executive
Jet.80 A contrary interpretation of Executive Jet's applicabil-
ity to DOHSA actions in a case involving almost the identical
geography was expressed in Teachey v. United Statess in
which the aircraft in question, a helicopter, flew from Key
West, Florida across the Gulf of Mexico, to St. Petersburg,
Florida. The court held that a flight from one land base to
another could not be considered "maritime" but noted that
the Executive Jet doctrine would permit an action under
DOHSA or the Federal Tort Claims Act. 2
Teachey expresses the view, held by the majority of courts
and commentators, that DOHSA contains its own statutory
base of jurisdiction requiring only that the tort occur more
than one marine league from shore.83 The Supreme Court in
Executive Jet clearly excluded DOHSA actions from its mari-
time nexus requirement.84 As one court recently observed:
"[T]he [Executive Jet] Court made it quite clear that such a
showing was not required in aviation cases brought under the
Death on the High Seas Act.""
71 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973). The Supreme Court, reversing on other
grounds, did not address the maritime nexus issue. See supra notes 41-44 and accom-
panying text.
7 Id. at 1167.
7, 531 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Fla. 1982).
79 Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.
363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
Id. at 1198-99.
I Id. at 1199.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
" In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, 531 F. Supp. 1175, 1184 (W.D. Wash.
1982).
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C. Definition of "High Seas"
Another jurisdictional issue found in DOHSA actions is that
of the scope of its jurisdiction. The Act states where DOHSA
jurisdiction begins but does not specify how far it extends.8 A
number of decisions appear to have settled this question.
DOHSA applies to deaths occurring on the high seas more
than a marine league from the shores of any state or territory
within the meaning of the Act.87 The "high seas" includes for-
eign territorial waters. DOHSA has been applied to a crash
occurring in Indian territorial waters,88 to a death occurring
on Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, se to the crash of an airplane
300 feet short of a Kingston, Jamaica runway, 0 to the wrong-
ful death of a seaman in Peruvian navigable waters," and to a
death in Bahamian territorial waters.92
D. Definition of Navigable Waters
Unique issues of navigability arise in aviation cases. Admi-
ralty jurisdiction applies to navigable waters. A body of water
is "navigable" if it is used or susceptible to use in its natural
or ordinary condition as a highway for commerce over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in customary
modes."8 This includes waters which "were navigable in the
past or which could be made navigable in fact by 'reasonable
improvements,' and waters within the ebb and flow of the
tide.""9
If a tort occurs on a "vessel" on a body of water, certain
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
Id. See also 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1976).
"In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
Sanchez v. Loffland Brothers Co., 626 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 962 (1981).
"Mancuso v. Kimex, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
Cormier v. Williams/Sedco/Horn Constructors, 460 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. La.
1978).
Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 908 (1967); but see Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1015 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1714 (1982).
e Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 644
F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 596 (1981).
" Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 1978).
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issues of navigability in fact are not raised. Torts occurring on
an airplane flying over water raise additional novel issues. For
example, what if the water where the crash occurs is three feet
deep, two feet deep or ten inches deep? Caribbean waters
depths range from inches to miles, yet an airplane crash into
those waters may be classified as occurring on the high seas
even though the place of the accident is not "navigable" in
terms of supporting a vessel.
V. EXCLUSIVITY
A. The Interaction of Sections 761 and 764
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,"0 the Supreme Court
directed that once DOHSA subject matter jurisdiction is es-
tablished, DOHSA is the exclusive remedy.6 Section 761 of
the Act applies to wrongful death actions resulting from
deaths occurring in navigable waters more than a marine
league from any state regardless of whether the site of the ac-
cident is within the territorial waters of a foreign country. 7 A
cursory reading appears to reveal that this section conflicts
with section 764 of the same Act. 8 Section 764 provides:
RIGHTS OF ACTION GIVEN BY LAWS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign
State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect or a default
occurring upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in
an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of the United
States without abatement in respect to the amount for which
recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the
contrary notwithstanding.'
A potential conflict arises from the interaction of sections
761 and 764. Section 761 permits recovery under DOHSA sec-
tion 762 for pecuniary damages only. A foreign nation's laws
436 U.S. 618 (1978).
See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
Id. § 764.
"Id.
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applicable under section 764, may afford a greater measure of
recovery. The legal dispute has centered on whether section
761 and section 764 provide cumulative remedies, or whether
the two sections are mutually exclusive. The controversy has
not been settled by the Supreme Court, but the weight of case
law supports the position that the two sections are mutually
exclusive. 00 Determination of which section applies requires
the factual/legal analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Lauritzen v. Larsen,'01 which was a Jones Act case. 02 Al-
though its applicability to DOHSA' 0s cases has not been au-
thoritatively settled, numerous courts have applied its choice
of law principles in DOHSA actions.'04 The factors used by
the Supreme Court in Lauritzen included: (1) the place of the
wrongful act, (2) the law of the flag, (3) the allegiance or dom-
icile of the injured, (4) the allegiance of the ship owner, (5)
the place of the contract, (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign
forum, and (7) the law of the forum.' 0'
B. Is DOHSA the Exclusive Remedy When Death Occurs on
the High Seas?
Historically, certain maritime tort actions could be initiated
in state courts and were not limited to admiralty jurisdic-
tion.106 A plaintiff could sue to recover for a death on the high
100 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash.
1982); Bergeron v. KLM, 188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal dismissed, 299
F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1962).
345 U.S. 571 (1953).
102 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
103 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 764 (1976).
104 See DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F. 2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435
U.S. 904 (1978); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967); In re Air Crash Disaster near Bombay, 531 F.
Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 556 (D.
Del. 1962); Bergeron v. KLM, 188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal dismissed,
299 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1962). The Lauritzen choice of law test has been held applicable
to general maritime cases also. See, e.g., Romero Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354 (1959).
'" Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-91.
' See Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y.
1965).
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seas in state court.1 0 7 Such a case would be removed to federal
court, but as a diversity action rather than an admiralty ac-
tion. If the suit had been brought in admiralty rather than in
maritime law, it could not have been filed in state court in the
first place. The passage of DOHSA in 1920 has not curtailed
some state courts from continuing to entertain actions for
wrongful death on the high seas.108
This issue was comprehensively examined in the recent case
of Rairigh v. Erlbeck,10 9 in which the court acknowledged the
decisions finding federal DOHSA jurisdiction exclusive, 10 but
opted to follow those courts which have upheld concurrent ju-
risdiction."' The Rairigh court declined to extract a mandate
of DOHSA exclusivity from the Higginbotham decision.1 2
Several circuits, however, have recently reaffirmed DOHSA's
exclusivity.113
VI. BENEFICIARIES UNDER DOHSA
Section 7611 provides:
The personal representative of the decedent may maintain a
suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in
admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, hus-
band, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel,
person, or corporation which would have been liable if death
had not ensued. 16
107 Id.
I" Id. The Safir court observed that Section 7 of the Act, currently codified at 46
U.S.C. § 767 (1976), preserves the effect of state statutes and is essentially remedial
and supplementary rather than substantive. Id. at 508 n.2.
1o 488 F. Supp. 865 (D. Md. 1980).
330 See, e.g., Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Higa v. Transocean
Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
" See Lowe v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Safir v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
"' Rairigh v. Erlbeck, 488 F. Supp. 865, 868 n.7.
" See, e.g., Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319, 327 (5th Cir. 1982)
Ford v. Wooten, 681 F.2d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 1982).
'4 46 U.S;C. § 761 (1976).
"8 Id. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), provides a right of action to spouses
and children primarily. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). Parents and dependent next of kin are
"contingent beneficiaries." See Rowston v. Oglebay Norton Co., 180 F. Supp. 803
(N.D. Ohio 1960).
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The surviving spouse, parent or child need not show "de-
pendency." Only dependent relatives need'prove their depen-
dency. 16 A dependent relative'may be related by affinity as
well as consanquinity. 1" 7 Stepchildren may recover under sec-
tion 761.1 A stepson who is supported but not adopted has
been considered a dependent relative for purposes of the
act."' An illegitimate child, as well, may be a beneficiary. 20
Thus the surviving spouse, parent or child need only prove
and show the pecuniary loss sustained by the death. The "de-
pendent" relative must show both a dependency and the pe-
cuniary loss sustained in order to recover.
VII. DAMAGES
A. A Pecuniary Measure
The damages recoverable under the Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA) are limited to pecuniary damages only.' 2' Pecu-
niary damages are damages which flow from the deprivation
of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might have
reasonably received if the deceased had not died from his in-
juries. A pecuniary loss or damage is one which can be mea-
sured by some standard."2 These pecuniary damages do not
include loss of society, companionship, love or affection,"3 nor
do they include either the decedent's conscious pain and suf-
fering,1 24, or the survivor's pain and suffering or grief."15 They
may include the loss of net accumulations from the estate or
recovery for inheritable estate if the survivor is reasonably ex-
pected to have inherited from the decedent."'2 There is a split
"' See Petition of Risdal & Anderson, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 353 (D. Mass. 1968).
"' Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1969).
118 Id.
11 Id.
"So Petition of Risdal & Anderson, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1968); Doyle v.
Albatross Tanker Corp., 260 F. Supp. 303, aff'd, 367 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1966).
2-' 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976).
122 See Michigan Central R.R. Co., v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
120 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
:" See Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
215 See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
12 See Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 801
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of authority as to whether expenses for funeral or memorial
services are recoverable under this pecuniary standard. In
Barbe v. Drummond, 2 7 the First Circuit held that funeral ex-
penses were not recoverable, but the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that if the survivor has paid for the funeral, he has suf-
fered a pecuniary loss for which he can recover. There is, of
course, no recovery if the estate has paid for the funeral.128
What, then, is recoverable under DOHSA's pecuniary stan-
dard? A survivor may recover for both loss of support and loss
of services.12 9 Loss of services involves services that the dece-
dent performed for the survivor which can be measured
financially. These services might include household duties
such as mowing the lawn or doing the dishes.
Children may recover for loss of nurture. Loss of nurture is
a separate item of damage from the loss of a parent's society
and companionship.130 It is the loss by a child of parental
guidance and training. Nurture has also been defined as the
parent's guidance, care and discipline. 1 3 The loss of nurture,
guidance and control is distinct from the loss of love and af-
fection."3 ' Courts are in agreement that although this item of
damage cannot be computed with any degree of mathematical
certainty, the loss of nurture, instruction, physical, intellec-
tual and moral training may be considered as pecuniary loss
under DOHSA.' 88 The difficulty inherent in creating a
formula to compute loss of nuture was articulated by a Texas
federal district court as follows:
(1977); National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 361
U.S. 885 (1959); Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F. Supp. 752 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
117 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
" Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624 n.20.
'n See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
See Soloman v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
I1 See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 360 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. La. 1973),
aff'd in part, 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618
(1978).
I' See Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242, reh'g denied, modified in part, 523
F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975).
131 Id. See also Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962).
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Generally, the courts have defined the 'nurture' element on a
case to case basis. The facts and circumstances of each particu-
lar case control, not only the legal basis for such damages, but
the quantum as well. The courts consider many factors, includ-
ing the amount of attention and time previously given by the
parent to the child."'
B. Pre-Judgment Interest
Pre-judgment interest may be recovered in DOHSA actions.
Although generally the award of pre-judgment interest is dis-
cretionary with the court, in suits of admiralty the allowance
of interest is the rule rather than the exception. 135 Denial of
pre-judgment interest is appropriate only when there are "pe-
culiar circumstances" that render it inequitable for a losing
party to pay pre-judgment interest. Among the circumstances
that may justify awarding interest only from the date of judg-
ment are: (1) plaintiff's delay in bringing suit, (2) the exis-
tence of a genuine dispute regarding ultimate liability or the
complexity of the legal or factual issues to be resolved, and (3)
judgment in an amount substantially less than claimed. " '
There is another circumstance not yet addressed by the
courts. That is the case in which liability is admitted, and the
defendant expresses a desire to settle for pecuniary loss, but
for one reason or another, the plaintiff refuses to take the
money.
C. Inflation and Income Taxes
The general rule is that inflation and the decrease in the
purchasing power of a dollar may be taken into consideration
in damage awards. 187 The effect of income taxes on future
'" Stanford v. McLean Trucking Co., 506 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (E.D. Tex.
1981)(emphasis added).
"' See National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 361
U.S. 885 (1959); see also Noritake Co. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724 (5th
Cir. 1980).
:3 Mecom v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 622 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1980).
"' See Byrd v. Reederei, 638 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Culver v. Slater
Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982).
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earnings may also be considered in damage awards. 38
D. Right to Jury Trial
Suits in admiralty are tried by the courts unless otherwise
provided for by statute. The Jones Act provides for trial by
jury; DOHSA and the general maritime law do not.139 But if
an admiralty claim is brought with a Jones Act claim, a jury
trial may be requested for both.14 0
VIII. CONCLUSION
The jurisdiction of the states' wrongful-death acts may not
be conclusively defined, as some courts have ruled, by Higgin-
botham, but if DOHSA is not the exclusive remedy for deaths
on the high seas, the jurisdicitional tangles will be myriad. For
example: an airplane crashes in Bahamian waters, and as a
result, suit is brought in a Florida court. Does the Florida
Wrongful Death Act, which is not limited to Florida bounda-
ries, apply? Does the Bahamian Fatal Accidents Act apply?
Does DOHSA apply, and if so, concurrently or exclusively?
What of pendant jurisdiction? If it is unknown whether the
accident occurred within or beyond the three-mile limit,
should the action be brought in state or federal court? Is the
state action pendant to the federal action? Whether or not
DOHSA affords the exclusive remedy, many sub-issues remain
unsettled.
IM Norfolk Western Ry. Co. v. Lipelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
" See Romero v. Int'l. Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371 n.28 (1959).
" See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 589 n.24 (1974). See also Fitz-
gerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963)(involving Jones Act, unseawor-
thiness, and maintenance and cure claims); Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419
F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1969)(Jones Act and DOHSA claims). See generally 5 J. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice § 38.35[4] n.42 (2d Ed. 1982).
